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Abstract
To achieve general intelligence, agents must learn how to interact with others in
a shared environment: this is the challenge of multiagent reinforcement learning
(MARL). The simplest form is independent reinforcement learning (InRL), where
each agent treats its experience as part of its (non-stationary) environment. In
this paper, we first observe that policies learned using InRL can overfit to the
other agents’ policies during training, failing to sufficiently generalize during
execution. We introduce a new metric, joint-policy correlation, to quantify this
effect. We describe an algorithm for general MARL, based on approximate best
responses to mixtures of policies generated using deep reinforcement learning, and
empirical game-theoretic analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection.
The algorithm generalizes previous ones such as InRL, iterated best response,
double oracle, and fictitious play. Then, we present a scalable implementation
which reduces the memory requirement using decoupled meta-solvers. Finally,
we demonstrate the generality of the resulting policies in two partially observable
settings: gridworld coordination games and poker.
1 Introduction
Deep reinforcement learning combines deep learning [58] with reinforcement learning [95, 63] to
compute a policy used to drive decision-making [72, 71]. Traditionally, a single agent interacts with
its environment repeatedly, iteratively improving its policy by learning from its observations. Inspired
by recent success in Deep RL, we are now seeing a renewed interest in multiagent reinforcement
learning (MARL) [91, 17, 100]. In MARL, several agents interact and learn in an environment
simultaneously, either competitively such as in Go [92] and Poker [39, 106, 73], cooperatively such
as when learning to communicate [23, 94, 36], or some mix of the two [59, 96, 35].
The simplest form of MARL is independent RL (InRL), where each learner is oblivious to the other
agents and simply treats all the interaction as part of its (“localized”) environment. Aside from
the problem that these local environments are non-stationary and non-Markovian [56] resulting in
a loss of convergence guarantees for many algorithms, the policies found can overfit to the other
agents’ policies and hence not generalize well. There has been relatively little work done in RL
community on overfitting to the environment [103, 68], but we argue that this is particularly important
in multiagent settings where one must react dynamically based on the observed behavior of others.
Classical techniques collect or approximate extra information such as the joint values [61, 19, 29, 55],
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use adaptive learning rates [12], adjust the frequencies of updates [48, 80], or dynamically respond
to the other agents actions online [62, 50]. However, with the notable exceptions of very recent
work [22, 79], they have focused on (repeated) matrix games and/or the fully-observable case.
There have been several proposals for treating partial observability in the multiagent setting. When
the model is fully known and the setting is strictly adversarial with two players, there are policy
iteration methods based on regret minimization that scale very well when using domain-specific
abstractions [27, 14, 46, 47], which was a major component of the expert no-limit poker AI Libra-
tus [15]; recently these methods were combined with deep learning to create an expert no-limit
poker AI called DeepStack [73]. There is a significant amount of work that deals with the case of
decentralized cooperative problems [75, 78], and in the general setting by extending the notion of
belief states and Bayesian updating from POMDPs [28]. These models are quite expressive, and the
resulting algorithms are fairly complex. In practice, researchers often resort to approximate forms, by
sampling or exploiting structure, to ensure good performance due to intractability [41, 2, 67].
In this paper, we introduce a new metric for quantifying the correlation effects of policies learned by
independent learners, and demonstrate the severity of the overfitting problem. These coordination
problems have been well-studied in the fully-observable cooperative case [69]: we observe similar
problems in a partially-observed mixed cooperative/competitive setting and, and we show that the
severity increases as the environment becomes more partially-observed. We propose a new algorithm
based on economic reasoning [81], which uses (i) deep reinforcement learning to compute best
responses to a distribution over policies, and (ii) empirical game-theoretic analysis to compute new
meta-strategy distributions. As is common in the MARL setting, we assume centralized training for
decentralized execution: policies are represented as separate neural networks and there is no sharing
of gradients nor architectures among agents. The basic form uses a centralized payoff table, which is
removed in the distributed, decentralized form that requires less space.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we start with basic building blocks necessary to describe the algorithm. We interleave
this with the most relevant previous work for our setting. Several components of the general idea have
been (re)discovered many times across different research communities, each with slightly different
but similar motivations. One aim here is therefore to unify the algorithms and terminology.
A normal-form game is a tuple (Π, U, n) where n is the number of players, Π = (Π1, · · · ,Πn)
is the set of policies (or strategies, one for each player i ∈ [[n]], where [[n]] = {1, · · · , n}), and
U : Π→ <n is a payoff table of utilities for each joint policy played by all players. Extensive-form
games extend these formalisms to the multistep sequential case (e.g. poker).
Players try to maximize their own expected utility. Each player does this by choosing a policy
from Πi, or by sampling from a mixture (distribution) over them σi ∈ ∆(Πi). In this multiagent
setting, the quality of σi depends on other players’ strategies, and so it cannot be found nor assessed
independently. Every finite extensive-form game has an equivalent normal-form [53], but since it is
exponentially larger, most algorithms have to be adapted to handle the sequential setting directly.
There are several algorithms for computing strategies. In zero-sum games (where ∀pi ∈ Π,~1 ·
U(pi) = 0), one can use e.g. linear programming, fictitious play [13], replicator dynamics [98],
or regret minimization [8]. Some of these techniques have been extended to extensive (sequential)
form [39, 25, 54, 108] with an exponential increase in the size of the state space. However, these
extensions have almost exclusively treated the two-player case, with some notable exceptions [54, 26].
Fictitious play also converges in potential games which includes cooperative (identical payoff) games.
The double oracle (DO) algorithm [70] solves a set of (two-player, normal-form) subgames induced
by subsets Πt ⊂ Π at time t. A payoff matrix for the subgame Gt includes only those entries
corresponding to the strategies in Πt. At each time step t, an equilibrium σ∗,t is obtained for Gt, and
to obtain Gt+1 each player adds a best response pit+1i ∈ BR(σ∗,t−i ) from the full space Πi, so for all i,
Πt+1i = Π
t
i ∪ {pit+1i }. The algorithm is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that finding an equilibrium in a
zero-sum game takes time polynomial in |Πt|, and is PPAD-complete for general-sum [90].
Clearly, DO is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium in two-player games. But, in the worst-case,
the entire strategy space may have to be enumerated. For example, this is necessary for Rock-Paper-
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Figure 1: The Double Oracle Algorithm. Figure taken from [10] with authors’ permission.
Scissors, whose only equilibrium has full support ( 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ). However, there is evidence that support
sizes shrink for many games as a function of episode length, how much hidden information is revealed
and/or effects it has on the payoff [64, 86, 10]. Extensions to the extensive-form games have been
developed [66, 9, 10] but still large state spaces are problematic due to the curse of dimensionality.
Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) is the study of meta-strategies obtained through simulation
in complex games [101, 102]. An empirical game, much smaller in size than the full game, is
constructed by discovering strategies, and meta-reasoning about the strategies to navigate the strategy
space. This is necessary when it is prohibitively expensive to explicitly enumerate the game’s
strategies. Expected utilities for each joint strategy are estimated and recorded in an empirical
payoff table. The empirical game is analyzed, and the simulation process continues. EGTA has been
employed in trading agent competitions (TAC) and automated bidding auctions.
One study used evolutionary dynamics in the space of known expert meta-strategies in Poker [82].
Recently, reinforcement learning has been used to validate strategies found via EGTA [105]. In this
work, we aim to discover new strategies through learning. However, instead of computing exact best
responses, we compute approximate best responses using reinforcement learning. A few epochs of
this was demonstrated in continuous double auctions using tile coding [87]. This work follows up in
this line, running more epochs, using modern function approximators (deep networks), a scalable
implementation, and with a focus on finding policies that can generalize across contexts.
A key development in recent years is deep learning [58]. While most work in deep learning has
focused on supervised learning, impressive results have recently been shown using deep neural
networks for reinforcement learning, e.g. [92, 38, 72, 76]. For instance, Mnih et al. [72] train policies
for playing Atari video games and 3D navigation [71], given only screenshots. Silver et al. introduced
AlphaGo [92, 93], combining deep RL with Monte Carlo tree search, outperforming human experts.
Computing approximate responses is more computationally feasible, and fictitious play can handle
approximations [42, 60]. It is also more biologically plausible given natural constraints of bounded
rationality. In behavioral game theory [104, 83], the focus is to predict actions taken by humans,
and the responses are intentionally constrained to increase predictive ability. A recent work uses a
deep learning architecture [34]. The work that closely resembles ours is level-k thinking [20] where
level k agents respond to level k − 1 agents, and more closely cognitive hierarchy [18], in which
responses are to distributions over levels {0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. However, our goals and motivations are
very different: we use the setup as a means to produce more general policies rather than to predict
human behavior. Furthermore, we consider the sequential setting rather than normal-form games.
Lastly, there has been several studies from the literature on co-evolutionary algorithms; specifically,
how learning cycles and overfitting to the current populations can be mitigated [77, 85, 52].
3 Policy-Space Response Oracles
We now present our main conceptual algorithm, policy-space response oracles (PSRO). The algorithm
is a natural generalization of Double Oracle where the meta-game’s choices are policies rather than
actions. It also generalizes Fictitious Self-Play [39, 40]. Unlike previous work, any meta-solver
can be plugged in to compute a new meta-strategy. In practice, parameterized policies (function
approximators) are used to generalize across the state space without requiring any domain knowledge.
The process is summarized in Algorithm 1. The meta-game is represented as an empirical game,
starting with a single policy (uniform random) and growing, each epoch, by adding policies (“oracles”)
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Algorithm 1: Policy-Space Response Oracles
input : initial policy sets for all players Π
Compute exp. utilities UΠ for each joint pi ∈ Π
Initialize meta-strategies σi = UNIFORM(Πi)
while epoch e in {1, 2, · · · } do
for player i ∈ [[n]] do
for many episodes do
Sample pi−i ∼ σ−i
Train oracle pi′i over ρ ∼ (pi′i, pi−i)
Πi = Πi ∪ {pi′i}
Compute missing entries in UΠ from Π
Compute a meta-strategy σ from UΠ
Output current solution strategy σi for player i
Algorithm 2: Deep Cognitive Hierarchies
input :player number i, level k
while not terminated do
CHECKLOADMS({j|j ∈ [[n]], j 6= i}, k)
CHECKLOADORACLES(j ∈ [[n]], k′ ≤ k)
CHECKSAVEMS(σi,k)
CHECKSAVEORACLE(pii,k)
Sample pi−i ∼ σ−i,k
Train oracle pii,k over ρ1 ∼ (pii,k, pi−i)
if iteration number mod Tms = 0 then
Sample pii ∼ σi,k
Compute ui(ρ2), where ρ2 ∼ (pii, pi−i)
Update stats for pii and update σi,k
Output σi,k for player i at level k
that approximate best responses to the meta-strategy of the other players. In (episodic) partially
observable multiagent environments, when the other players are fixed the environment becomes
Markovian and computing a best response reduces to solving a form of MDP [30]. Thus, any
reinforcement learning algorithm can be used. We use deep neural networks due to the recent success
in reinforcement learning. In each episode, one player is set to oracle(learning) mode to train pi′i, and
a fixed policy is sampled from the opponents’ meta-strategies (pi−i ∼ σ−i). At the end of the epoch,
the new oracles are added to their policy sets Πi, expected utilities for new policy combinations are
computed via simulation and added to the empirical tensor UΠ, which takes time exponential in |Π|.
Define ΠT = ΠT−1 ∪ {pi′} as the policy space including the currently learning oracles, and |σi| =
|ΠTi | for all i ∈ [[n]]. Iterated best response is an instance of PSRO with σ−i = (0, 0, · · · , 1, 0).
Similarly, Independent RL and fictitious play are instances of PSRO with σ−i = (0, 0, · · · , 0, 1) and
σ−i = (1/K, 1/K, · · · , 1/K, 0), respectively, where K = |ΠT−1−i |. Double Oracle is an instance of
PSRO with n = 2 and σT set to a Nash equilibrium profile of the meta-game (ΠT−1, UΠ
T−1
).
An exciting question is what can happen with (non-fixed) meta-solvers outside this known space?
Fictitious play is agnostic to the policies it is responding to; hence it can only sharpen the meta-
strategy distribution by repeatedly generating the same best responses. On the other hand, responses
to equilibrium strategies computed by Double Oracle will (i) overfit to a specific equilibrium in the
n-player or general-sum case, and (ii) be unable to generalize to parts of the space not reached by any
equilibrium strategy in the zero-sum case. Both of these are undesirable when computing general
policies that should work well in any context. We try to balance these problems of overfitting with a
compromise: meta-strategies with full support that force (mix in) γ exploration over policy selection.
3.1 Meta-Strategy Solvers
A meta-strategy solver takes as input the empirical game (Π, UΠ) and produces a meta-strategy σi
for each player i. We try three different solvers: regret-matching, Hedge, and projected replicator
dynamics. These specific meta-solvers accumulate values for each policy (“arm”) and an aggregate
value based on all players’ meta-strategies. We refer to ui(σ) as player i’s expected value given
all players’ meta-strategies and the current empirical payoff tensor UΠ (computed via multiple
tensor dot products.) Similarly, denote ui(pii,k, σ−i) as the expected utility if player i plays their
kth ∈ [[K]] ∪ {0} policy and the other players play with their meta-strategy σ−i. Our strategies use
an exploration parameter γ, leading to a lower bound of γK+1 on the probability of selecting any pii,k.
The first two meta-solvers (Regret Matching and Hedge) are straight-forward applications of previous
algorithms, so we defer the details to Appendix A. Here, we introduce a new solver we call projected
replicator dynamics (PRD). From Appendix A, when using the asymmetric replicator dynamics,
e.g. with two players, where UΠ = (A,B), the change in probabilities for the kth component (i.e.,
the policy pii,k) of meta-strategies (σ1, σ2) = (x,y) are:
dxk
dt
= xk[(Ay)k − xTAy], dyk
dt
= yk[(x
TB)k − xTBy],
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To simulate the replicator dynamics in practice, discretized updates are simulated using a step-size of δ.
We add a projection operator P (·) to these equations that guarantees exploration: x← P (x+ δ dxdt ),
y ← P (y + δ dydt ), where P (x) = argminx′∈∆K+1γ {||x′ − x||}, if any xk < γ/(K + 1) or x
otherwise, and ∆K+1γ = {x | xk ≥ γK+1 ,
∑
k xk = 1} is the γ-exploratory simplex of size K + 1.
This enforces exploratory σi(pii,k) ≥ γ/(K + 1). The PRD approach can be understood as directing
exploration in comparison to standard replicator dynamics approaches that contain isotropic diffusion
or mutation terms (which assume undirected and unbiased evolution), for more details see [99].
3.2 Deep Cognitive Hierarchies
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
N players
pii,k
K + 1 levels
σ1,1
pi1,1
rand
rand
rand
rand
σi,k
Figure 2: Overview of DCH
While the generality of PSRO is clear and appealing, the
RL step can take a long time to converge to a good re-
sponse. In complex environments, much of the basic
behavior that was learned in one epoch may need to be
relearned when starting again from scratch; also, it may be
desirable to run many epochs to get oracle policies that can
recursively reason through deeper levels of contingencies.
To overcome these problems, we introduce a practical
parallel form of PSRO. Instead of an unbounded number
of epochs, we choose a fixed number of levels in advance.
Then, for an n-player game, we start nK processes in
parallel (level 0 agents are uniform random): each one trains a single oracle policy pii,k for player i
and level k and updates its own meta-strategy σi,k, saving each to a central disk periodically. Each
process also maintains copies of all the other oracle policies pij,k′≤k at the current and lower levels, as
well as the meta-strategies at the current level σ−i,k, which are periodically refreshed from a central
disk. We circumvent storing UΠ explicitly by updating the meta-strategies online. We call this a
Deep Cognitive Hierarchy (DCH), in reference to Camerer, Ho, & Chong’s model augmented with
deep RL. Example oracle response dynamics are shown in Figure 2, and pseudo-code in Algorithm 2.
Since each process uses slightly out-dated copies of the other process’s policies and meta-strategies,
DCH approximates PSRO. Specifically, it trades away accuracy of the correspondence to PSRO
for practical efficiency and, in particular, scalability. Another benefit of DCH is an asymptotic
reduction in total space complexity. In PSRO, for K policies and n players, the space required to
store the empirical payoff tensor is Kn. Each process in DCH stores nK policies of fixed size, and
n meta-strategies (and other tables) of size bounded by k ≤ K. Therefore the total space required
is O(nK · (nK + nK)) = O(n2K2). This is possible is due to the use of decoupled meta-solvers,
which compute strategies online without requiring a payoff tensor UΠ, which we describe now.
3.2.1 Decoupled Meta-Strategy Solvers
In the field of online learning, the experts algorithms (“full information” case) receive information
about each arm at every round. In the bandit (“partial information”) case, feedback is only given for
the arm that was pulled. Decoupled meta-solvers are essentially sample-based adversarial bandits [16]
applied to games. Empirical strategies are known to converge to Nash equilibria in certain classes of
games (i.e. zero-sum, potential games) due to the folk theorem [8].
We try three: decoupled regret-matching [33], Exp3 (decoupled Hedge) [3], and decoupled PRD. Here
again, we use exploratory strategies with γ of the uniform strategy mixed in, which is also necessary
to ensure that the estimates are unbiased. For decoupled PRD, we maintain running averages for the
overall average value an value of each arm (policy). Unlike in PSRO, in the case of DCH, one sample
is obtained at a time and the meta-strategy is updated periodically from online estimates.
4 Experiments
In all of our experiments, oracles use Reactor [31] for learning, which has achieved state-of-the-art
results in Atari game-playing. Reactor uses Retrace(λ) [74] for off-policy policy evaluation, and
β-Leave-One-Out policy gradient for policy updates, and supports recurrent network training, which
could be important in trying to match online experiences to those observed during training.
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The action spaces for each player are identical, but the algorithms do not require this. Our implemen-
tation differs slightly from the conceptual descriptions in Section 3; see App. C for details.
First-Person Gridworld Games. Each agent has a local field-of-view (making the world partially
observable), sees 17 spaces in front, 10 to either side, and 2 spaces behind. Consequently, observations
are encoded as 21x20x3 RGB tensors with values 0 – 255. Each agent has a choice of turning left or
right, moving forward or backward, stepping left or right, not moving, or casting an endless light
beam in their current direction. In addition, the agent has two composed actions of moving forward
and turning. Actions are executed simultaneously, and order of resolution is randomized. Agents
start on a random spawn point at the beginning of each episode. If an agent is touched (“tagged”) by
another agent’s light beam twice, then the target agent is immediately teleported to a spawn point. In
laser tag, the source agent then receives 1 point of reward for the tag. In another variant, gathering,
there is no tagging but agents can collect apples, for 1 point per apple, which refresh at a fixed rate.
In pathfind, there is no tagging nor apples, and both agents get 1 point reward when both reach their
destinations, ending the episode. In every variant, an episode consists of 1000 steps of simulation.
Other details, such as specific maps, can be found in Appendix D.
Leduc Poker is a common benchmark in Poker AI, consisting of a six-card deck: two suits with
three cards (Jack, Queen, King) each. Each player antes 1 chip to play, and receives one private card.
There are two rounds of betting, with a maximum of two raises each, whose values are 2 and 4 chips
respectively. After the first round of betting, a single public card is revealed. The input is represented
as in [40], which includes one-hot encodings of the private card, public card, and history of actions.
Note that we use a more difficult version than in previous work; see Appendix D.1 for details.
4.1 Joint Policy Correlation in Independent Reinforcement Learning
To identify the effect of overfitting in independent reinforcement learners, we introduce joint policy
correlation (JPC) matrices. To simplify the presentation, we describe here the special case of
symmetric two-player games with non-negative rewards; for a general description, see Appendix B.2.
Values are obtained by running D instances of the same experiment, differing only in the seed used
to initialize the random number generators. Each experiment d ∈ [[D]] (after many training episodes)
produces policies (pid1 , pi
d
2). The entries of each D ×D matrix shows the mean return over T = 100
episodes,
∑T
t=1
1
T (R
t
1 + R
t
2), obtained when player 1 uses row policy pi
di
1 and and player 2 uses
column policy pidj2 . Hence, entries on the diagonals represent returns for policies that learned together
(i.e., same instance), while off-diagonals show returns from policies that trained in separate instances.
0 1 2 3 4
Player #2
4
3
2
1
0
P
la
y
e
r 
#
1
25.1 27.3 29.6 5.3 29.8
27.3 31.7 27.6 30.6 26.2
14.6 12.9 30.3 7.3 23.8
29.9 30.8 17.8 11.0 15.5
30.7 30.9 23.9 3.7 9.2
6
12
18
24
30
0 1 2 3 4
Player #2
4
3
2
1
0
P
la
y
e
r 
#
1
0.5 3.5 0.6 3.9 19.2
3.6 2.6 4.1 20.5 4.7
18.2 2.3 20.0 6.0 2.6
12.2 18.2 11.3 0.8 8.2
23.0 2.9 18.5 7.1 0.6
4
8
12
16
20
Figure 3: Example JPC matrices for InRL on Laser Tag small2 map (left) and small4 (right).
From a JPC matrix, we compute an average proportional loss in reward asR− = (D¯−O¯)/D¯ where
D¯ is the mean value of the diagonals and O¯ is the mean value of the off-diagonals. E.g. in Figure 3:
D = 30.44, O = 20.03, R− = 0.342. Even in a simple domain with almost full observability
(small2), an independently-learned policy could expect to lose 34.2% of its reward when playing with
another independently-learned policy even though it was trained under identical circumstances! This
clearly demonstrates an important problem with independent learners. In the other variants (gathering
and pathfind), we observe no JPC problem, presumably because coordination is not required and the
policies are independent. Results are summarized in Table 1. We have also noticed similar effects
when using DQN [72] as the oracle training algorithm; see Appendix B.1 for example videos.
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Environment Map InRL DCH(Reactor, 2, 10) JPC Reduction
D¯ O¯ R− D¯ O¯ R−
Laser Tag small2 30.44 20.03 0.342 28.20 26.63 0.055 28.7 %
Laser Tag small3 23.06 9.06 0.625 27.00 23.45 0.082 54.3 %
Laser Tag small4 20.15 5.71 0.717 18.72 15.90 0.150 56.7 %
Gathering field 147.34 146.89 0.003 139.70 138.74 0.007 –
Pathfind merge 108.73 106.32 0.022 90.15 91.492 < 0 –
Table 1: Summary of JPC results in first-person gridworld games.
We see that a (level 10) DCH agent reduces the JPC problem significantly. On small2, DCH reduces
the expected loss down to 5.5%, 28.7% lower than independent learners. The problem gets larger as
the map size grows and problem becomes more partially observed, up to a severe 71.7% average loss.
The reduction achieved by DCH also grows from 28.7% to 56.7%.
Is the Meta-Strategy Necessary During Execution? The figures above represent the fully-mixed
strategy σi,10. We also analyze JPC for only the highest-level policy pii,10 in the laser tag levels. The
values are larger here: R− = 0.147, 0.27, 0.118 for small2-4 respectively, showing the importance of
the meta-strategy. However, these are still significant reductions in JPC: 19.5%, 36.5%, 59.9%.
How Many Levels? On small4, we also compute values for level 5 and level 3: R− = 0.156 and
R− = 0.246, corresponding to reductions in JPC of 56.1% and 44%, respectively. Level 5 reduces
JPC by a similar amount as level 10 (56.1% vs 56.7%), while level 3 less so (44% vs. 56.1%.)
4.2 Learning to Safely Exploit and Indirectly Model Opponents in Leduc Poker
We now show results for a Leduc poker where strong benchmark algorithms exist, such as counter-
factual regret (CFR) minimization [108, 11]. We evaluate our policies using two metrics: the first is
performance against fixed players (random, CFR’s average strategy after 500 iterations “cfr500”, and
a purified version of “cfr500pure” that chooses the action with highest probability.) The second is
commonly used in poker AI: NASHCONV(σ) =
∑n
i maxσ′i∈Σi ui(σ
′
i, σ−i)−ui(σ), representing, in
total, how much each player gains by deviating to their best response (unilaterally), a value that can
be interpreted as a distance from a Nash equilibrium (called exploitability in the two-player setting).
NashConv is easy to compute in small enough games [45]; for CFR’s values see Appendix E.2.
Effect of Exploration and Meta-Strategy Overview. We now analyze the effect of the various
meta-strategies and exploration parameters. In Figure 4, we measure the mean area-under-the-curve
(MAUC) of the NashConv values for the last (right-most) 32 values in the NashConv graph, and
exploration rate of γ = 0.4. Figures for the other values of γ are in Appendix E, but we found this
value of γ works best for minimizing NashConv. Also, we found that decoupled replicator dynamics
works best, followed by decoupled regret-matching and Exp3. Also, it seems that the higher the level,
the lower the resulting NashConv value is, with diminishing improvements. For exploitation, we
found that γ = 0.1 was best, but the meta-solvers seemed to have little effect (see Figure 11.)
Comparison to Neural Fictitious Self-Play. We now compare to Neural Fictitious Self-Play
(NFSP) [40], an implementation of fictitious play in sequential games using reinforcement learning.
Note that NFSP, PSRO, and DCH are all sample-based learning algorithms that use general function
approximation, whereas CFR is a tabular method that requires a full game-tree pass per iteration.
NashConv graphs are shown for {2,3}-player in Figure 5, and performance vs. fixed bots in Figure 6.
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Figure 4: (a) Effect of DCH parameters on NashConv in 2 player Leduc Poker. Left: decoupled PRD,
Middle: decoupled RM, Right: Exp3, and (b) MAUC of the exploitation graph against cfr500.
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Figure 5: Exploitability for NFSP x DCH x PSRO.
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Figure 6: Evaluation against fixed set of bots. Each data point is an average of the four latest values.
We observe that DCH (and PSRO) converge faster than NFSP at the start of training, possibly due to
a better meta-strategy than the uniform random one used in fictitious play. The convergence curves
eventually plateau: DCH in two-player is most affected, possibly due to the asynchronous nature of
the updates, and NFSP converges to a lower exploitability in later episodes. We believe that this is
due to NFSP’s ability to learn a more accurate mixed average strategy at states far down in the tree,
which is particularly important in poker, whereas DCH and PSRO mix at the top over full policies.
On the other hand, we see that PSRO/DCH are able to achieve higher performance against the
fixed players. Presumably, this is because the policies produced by PSRO/DCH are better able to
recognize flaws in the weaker opponent’s policies, since the oracles are specifically trained for this,
and dynamically adapt to the exploitative response during the episode. So, NFSP is computing a safe
equilibrium while PSRO/DCH may be trading convergence precision for the ability to adapt to a range
of different play observed during training, in this context computing a robust counter-strategy [44, 24].
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we quantify a severe problem with independent reinforcement learners, joint pol-
icy correlation (JPC), that limits the generality of these approaches. We describe a generalized
algorithm for multiagent reinforcement learning that subsumes several previous algorithms. In our
experiments, we show that PSRO/DCH produces general policies that significantly reduce JPC in
partially-observable coordination games, and robust counter-strategies that safely exploit opponents
in a common competitive imperfect information game. The generality offered by PSRO/DCH can
be seen as a form of “opponent/teammate regularization”, and has also been observed recently in
practice [65, 5]. We emphasize the game-theoretic foundations of these techniques, which we hope
will inspire further investigation into algorithm development for multiagent reinforcement learning.
In future work, we will consider maintaining diversity among oracles via loss penalties based on policy
dissimilarity, general response graph topologies, environments such as emergent language games [57]
and RTS games [97, 84], and other architectures for prediction of behavior, such as opponent
modeling [37] and imagining future states via auxiliary tasks [43]. We would also like to investigate
fast online adaptation [1, 21] and the relationship to computational Theory of Mind [107, 4], as well
as generalized (transferable) oracles over similar opponent policies using successor features [6].
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Appendices
A Meta-Solvers
A.1 Regret matching
Regret matching (RM) is a simple adaptive procedure that leads to correlated equilibria [32], which
tabulates cumulative regret Ri(pii,k) for pii,k at epoch k. At each step, for all i simultaneously:
Ri(pii,k)← Ri(pii,k) + ui(pii,k, σ−i)− ui(σ). A new meta-strategy is obtained by normalizing the
positive portions Ri, and setting the negative values to zero:
σi(pii,k) =
R+(pii,k)∑[[K]]∪{0}
k R
+(pii,k)
if the denominator is positive, or
1
K + 1
otherwise ,
where x+ = max(0, x). In our case, we use exploratory strategies that enforce exploration: σ′i =
γUNIF(K + 1) + (1− γ)σi.
A.2 Hedge
Hedge is similar, except it accumulates only rewards in xi,k and uses a softmax function to derive
a new strategy [3]. At each step, xi,k ← xi,k + ui(pii,k, σ−i), and a new strategy σi(pii,k) =
exp( γK+1xi,k)/
∑[[K]]∪{0}
k exp(
γ
K+1xi,k). Again here, we use strategies that mix in γUNIF(K+ 1).
A.3 Replicator Dynamics
Replicator dynamics are a system of differential equations that describe how a population of strategies,
or replicators, evolve through time. In their most basic form they correspond to the biological selection
principle, comparing the fitness of a strategy to the average fitness of the entire population. More
specifically the symmetric replicator dynamic mechanism is expressed as
dxk
dt
= xk[(Ax)k − xTAx].
Here, xk represents the density of strategy pii,k in the population (σi(pii,k) for a given k), A is the
payoff matrix which describes the different payoff values each individual replicator receives when
interacting with other replicators in the population. This common formulation represents symmetric
games, and typical examples of dynamics are taken from prisoner’s dilemma, matching pennies, and
stag hunt games. For a more elaborate introduction to replicator dynamics, and their relationship with
RL, we refer to [7].
Asymmetric replicator dynamics are applied to n-player games normal form games, e.g. in two
players using payoff tables A and B, where A 6= BT . Examples are the infamous prisoner’s dilemma
and the Rock-Scissors-Paper games, in which both agents are interchangeable. In the evolutionary
setting this means that the agents are drawn from a single population. In general however, the
symmetry assumption no longer holds, as players do not necessarily have access to the same sets of
strategies. In this context it means we now have two players that come from different populations:
dxk
dt
= xi[(Ay)k − xTAy], dyk
dt
= yi[(x
TB)k − xTBy],
where x corresponds to the row player and y to the column player. In general, there are n tensors,
representing the utility to each player for each outcome.
In this paper we use a new projected replicator dynamics that enforces exploration by putting a lower
bound on the probability on xk and yk.
B Joint Policy Correlation
B.1 Example Comparison Videos
This section points to several example videos of coordination (diagonals of the JPC experiments),
and miscoordination (off-diagonals of the JPC experiments).
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Laser Tag (small2)
• Diagonal: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8vXpdHuoQH8
• Off-Diagonal: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jOjwOkCM_i8
Laser Tag (small3)
• Diagonal: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5cpIG3GsLw
• Off-Diagonal: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zilU0hXvGK4
In these videos, DQN was used to train the oracle policies, though the effects are similar with ReActor.
B.2 JPC in General n-player Environments
In Section 4.1 we introduced joint policy correlation for symmetric games with n = 2 and non-
negative rewards. In this section, we present the general description of JPC that can be used for any
finite (symmetric or asymmetric) n-player game with arbitrary rewards.
In general, each player has their own tensor of utilities values Ui. If there are d separate independent
learning instances, then Ui has dimensionality dn for each player i, and each entry corresponds to an
expected utility to player i receives with a given combination of policies produced for each player in
each instance.
For example, for a four-player game and five independent learning instances (labeled 0, 1, · · · 4), the
value U4[0][3][2][2] corresponds to the expected return of the fourth player when:
• the first player uses their learned policy pi1 from instance 0,
• the second player uses their learned policy pi2 from instance 3,
• the third player uses their learned policy pi3 from instance 2,
• the fourth player uses their learned policy pi4 from instance 2.
The definitions of average values over diagonals and off-diagonals and average proportional reduction
must now be indexed by the player i, and operate only on player i’s values in Ui. As a result, D¯i is
an average over d values and O¯i is an average over dn − d values, and R¯i is defined analogously as
in Section 4.1 but instead using D¯i and O¯i. When n is large an estimate of O¯i can be used instead,
by sampling O(d) entries from the exponentially many values.
Note that in asymmetric games, the JPC problem will vary across players. Therefore, it is not clear
how to aggregate and report a single value (summary). The simplest solution is to present a vector, ~R,
containing R¯i for each player, which exposes how each player is affected separately.
C Algorithm Details and Parameter Values
C.1 Network, Oracle, and Training Parameters
Unless otherwise stated, we use the default parameter settings and architecture reported in the Reactor
paper. We set λ = 0.9, use a LSTM sequence (unroll) length of 32, with a batch size of 4, learning
rate α = 0.0001, and momentum β1 = 0, the ADAM optimizer [49], replay buffer of size 500000,
and memorizing behavior probabilities for Retrace off-policy corrections.
The main network architecture is based on the default Reactor network, except without a head for
estimated behavior distributions (using purely memorized behavior probabilities), as illustrated in
Figure 7.
For gridworld coordination games, we use three convolutional layers of kernel widths (4, 5, 3) and
strides (2, 1, 1) each outputting 8 planes. The main fully-connected layer has 32 units and each LSTM
layer has 32 units. Every layer, except the LSTM, was followed by a concatenated ReLU layer [89]
effectively doubling the number of outputs to 16 for following layers. The rest of the architecture is
the same as the default architecture in the Reactor paper.
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Figure 7: Reactor network architecture. Modified file taken from [31] with permission of authors.
For Leduc poker, we use two fully-connected hidden layers of size 128, with rectified linear units
non-linearities at the end of each layer. In each case, these are followed by an LSTM layer of size 32
and fully-connected layer of size 32.
C.2 Neural Fictitious Self-Play (NFSP)
In our tuning experiments for NFSP, we tried and found the following best values for NFSP.
Values of the form x → y refer to a linear schedule starting at x, ending at (and remaining at) y.
Values expresses as 5e-5 refer to 5 · 10−5.
C.2.1 NFSP parameters for in Two-Player Leduc
Parameter Value Set Final Value
RL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-3
SL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-5
Anticipatory parameter 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 0.1
Reservoir buffer size 100000, 1000000 100000
Best values for NashConv in two-player Leduc.
Parameter Value Set Final Value
RL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-4
SL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-5
Anticipatory parameter 0.1, 0.5 0.5
Reservoir buffer size 100000, 1000000 1000000
Best values for exploitation against random bots in two-player Leduc.
Parameter Value Set Final Value
RL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-3
SL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-4
Anticipatory parameter 0.1, 0.5 0.5
Reservoir buffer size 100000, 1000000 100000
Best values for exploitation against cfr500 bots in two-player Leduc.
C.2.2 NFSP parameters in Three-Player Leduc
Parameter Value Set Final Value
RL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-4
SL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-4
Anticipatory parameter 0.1, 0.5 0.5
Reservoir buffer size 100000, 1000000 1000000
Best values for NashConv in three-player Leduc.
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Parameter Value Set Final Value
RL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-3
SL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-5
Anticipatory parameter 0.1, 0.5 0.5
Reservoir buffer size 100000, 1000000 100000
Best values for exploitation versus random bots in three-player Leduc.
Parameter Value Set Final Value
RL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-5
SL learning rate 1e-3, 1e-4, 1e-5 1e-3
Anticipatory parameter 0.1, 0.5 0.5
Reservoir buffer size 100000, 1000000 100000
Best values for exploitation versus cfr500 bots in three-player Leduc.
C.3 Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO)
In our Leduc Poker experiments, we use an alternating implementation that switches periodically
between computing the best response (oracle training phase) and meta-strategy learning phase where
the empirical payoff tensor is updated and meta-strategy computed. We call this meta-game update
frequency in the parameters below. We also use ΠT as described in Section 3, so the current set
of policies includes (on the kth epoch) the currently training oracle pi′. Finally, we add controlled
exploration by linear annealing of the inverse temperature of the softmax policy head, starting at 0
(uniform random) to 1.
Since the setting (action space, observation space, reward space, and network architecture) differ
significantly in the setting of Leduc poker, we try different values for the hyper-parameters. Our
general methodology was to manually try a few from subsets of sensible ranges on two-player Leduc,
then use these values as starting points for three-player. Finally the values in PSRO were used as
starting points for DCH parameters.
For each parameter, we also give a rough sensitivity rating on a scale from 1 (not at all sensitive) to 5
(very sensitive) Overall, we found that the algorithms were fairly robust to different parameter values
in the range, and we note some main general points: (i) their values differed from those in the visual
domains such as Atari and our gridworld games, (ii) the most important parameter was the learning
rate.
C.3.1 PSRO Parameters in Two-Player Leduc Poker
Parameter Value Set Final Value SR
Learning rate 5e-5, 1e-4, 2.5e-4, 0.5e-4, 1e-3 5e-4 4
Batch size 4, 8, 16 16 1
Replay buffer size 1e5, 5e5 5e5 1
Sequence (unroll) length 2, 3, 8 2 2
Entropy cost 0, 0.01, 0.1 0.1 2
Exploration decay end 25000, 250000 250000 3
Target update period 1000, 5000, 10000 1000 2
Meta-game update frequency 2500, 5000 2500 1
Episodes per epoch 25000→ { 5e4, 1e5, 2.5e5 } 25000→ 2.5e5 2
Trace parameter (λ) 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0 0.95 1
Maximum epochs 20 20 –
SR stands for sensitivity rating. The exploration decay end is in number of steps taken by the ReActor
oracle.
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C.3.2 PSRO Parameters in Three-Player Leduc Poker
Parameter Value Set Final Value SR
Learning rate 5e-5, 1e-4, 2.5e-4, 0.5e-4, 1e-3 5e-4 4
Batch size 4, 8, 16 16 1
Replay buffer size 1e5, 5e5 5e5 1
Sequence (unroll) length 2, 3, 8 2 2
Entropy cost 0, 0.01, 0.1 0.1 2
Exploration decay end 25000, 250000 250000 3
Target update period 1000, 5000, 10000 1000 2
Meta-game update frequency 2500, 5000 2500 1
Episodes per epoch 25000→ { 5e4, 1e5, 2.5e5 } 25000→ 2.5e5 2
Trace parameter (λ) 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0 1.0∗ 1
Maximum epochs 20 20 –
∗The only value that changed moving to three-player Leduc was the trace parameter, λ, and it had
such a small effect that in the full runs we left λ = 0.95 for consistency.
C.4 DCH
C.4.1 DCH Parameters in First-Person Gridworld Coordination Games
In the first-person gridworld games, we use hyper-parameter settings that that are quite similar to the
default ReActor values [31], as noted above in Appendix C.1. In this environment, we found that
parameter values had little to no effect on the outcomes.
C.4.2 DCH Parameters in Two-Player Leduc Poker
In Leduc poker, there is one new parameter: the policy and meta-strategy save & load frequencies
(Tms in Algorithm 2). This is asynchronous analogue to the meta-game update frequency in PSRO.
The basic parameter tuning was more difficult for DCH due to large number of resources necessary.
Since we want to measure the tension between scalability and accuracy, we tune our hyper parameters
only on one value (1000) and include a sweep over Tms ∈ {1000, 2500, 5000} in the full runs.
We also try the smaller value since the decoupled meta-solvers are online and require more recent
up-to-date estimates of the values.
Parameter Value Set Final Value SR
Learning rate 1e-5, 5e-5, 1e-4, 2.5e-4, 0.5e-4, 1e-3 1e-4 4
Batch size 16 16 –
Replay buffer size 1e5, 5e5 5e5 1
Sequence (unroll) length 2, 3, 8 8 2
Entropy cost 0.1 0.1 –
Exploration decay end 25000, 250000 250000 3
Target update period 1000, 5000, 10000 10000 2
Trace parameter (λ) 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0 0.95 1
Policy + meta-strategy update frequency 1000, 2500, 5000 2500 1
C.4.3 DCH Parameters in Three-Player Leduc Poker
Parameter Value Set Final Value SR
Learning rate 1e-5, 5e-5, 1e-4, 2.5e-4, 0.5e-4, 1e-3 5e-4 4
Batch size 16 16 –
Replay buffer size 1e5, 5e5 5e5 1
Sequence (unroll) length 2, 3, 8 8 2
Entropy cost 0.1 0.1 –
Exploration decay end 25000, 250000 250000 3
Target update period 1000, 5000, 10000 10000 2
Trace parameter (λ) 0.75, 0.9, 0.95, 1.0 0.95 1
Policy + meta-strategy update frequency 1000, 2500, 5000 2500 1
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C.5 Meta-Solvers
For projected replicator dynamics, the average strategy value was tracked using a running average of
50 values. The value of each policy was tracked using a running average of 10 values. The step size
was set to δ = 0.01.
D Environments
Figure 8: Global view of Laser Tag small3 map (not seen by agents). Agents see a localized view.
Input to their networks is raw RGB pixels.
The maps we used are shown in Figure 9.
D.1 Representing Turn-based Games and Handling Illegal Moves
In poker, the number of legal actions that an agent can use is a subset of the total number of unique
actions in the entire game. Also, the game is turn-based so only one player acts at a given time.
A modification to the standard environment is made so that policies can be defined over a fixed set
of actions and independent of the specific underlying RL algorithm (i.e. DQN, ReAactor, etc.): the
environment presents all 3 actions at all times; if an illegal action is taken, then the agent receives a
reward equal to the lower bound of the payoff at a terminal node minus 1 (= −14 in Leduc), and a
random legal move is chosen instead. The resulting game is more complex and the agent must first
learn the rules of the game in addition to the strategy. This also makes the game general-sum, so CFR
and exploitability were instead run on the original game. Exploitability of PSRO, DCH, and NFSP
policies are computed by first transforming the policies to legal ones by masking out illegal moves
and renormalizing.
Some RL algorithms process experience using transition tuples of the form e.g. (s, a, r, s′), or longer
chains such as in ReActor. However, in turn-based games, given a trajectories
(st, at, rt, st+1, at+1, rt+1, st+2, · · · ),
the next state may not belong to the same player, so we construct player-specific tuples of the form
(st, at, rt, st+1, · · · , st+k, · · · ), where k is the number of steps until it becomes the same player’s
turn again, so e.g. in strictly-alternating games k = 2. Special cases are needed for terminal states,
where all players see the terminal state as the final transition.
E Results
See the following figures:
• Effect of DCH parameter values on NashConv in two-player Leduc: Figure 10.
• Effect of DCH parameter value of γ on NashConv overall in two-player Leduc: Figure 14.
• Effect of DCH parameter value of γ on NashConv per meta-solver two-player Leduc:
Figure 15.
• Effect of DCH parameter values on exploitation in two-player Leduc: Figure 11.
• Exploitation versus cfr500pure in two-player Leduc: Figure 12.
• Exploitation versus random bots in three-player Leduc: Figure 13.
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laser tag
small2 small3 small4
+-------+ +--------------+ +--------------------+
|P P| |P * *P | |P * *P |
| | | ** * | | ** * P |
| * * | | * * * | | * * * |
| ** ** | | * | | * *|
| * * | | * | | * * |
| | | P * * | | P * * |
|P P| | * P| | * P|
+-------+ +--------------+ | * |
| P |
| |
| * P |
|* |
+--------------------+
gathering - field pathfind - merge
+------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+
|F F | |*********************|
| F | |*********************|
| F | |*********************|
| P | | *** *** ****|
| P F | |00* * ** * * *@@|
|F F | | ** **** *** |
| | |11* * ** * * *##|
| F F | | *** *** ****|
| F | |*********************|
| | |*********************|
|F P P | |*********************|
| P | +---------------------+
| |
| P P F|
| F |
| F |
| F F |
| |
| P P |
| F |
| F F |
+------------------------------------------+
Figure 9: Maps used in gridworld games. Here, P is a spawn point for both players, * are blocked/wall
cells, F is food (apples), 0 and 1 are spawn points for player 1 and 2 respectively, @ and # are goal
locations for player 1 and 2 respectively.
E.1 Linear Regression Analysis to Interpret the Effect on DCH Parameters
Using the data from the final runs, we also tested the effect of removing individual parameter settings
(value of γ, the meta-solver, levels, number of levels, meta-strategy update period, learning rate) on
the outcomes of exploitability and explotation in DCH.
We do this by fitting an ordinary least squares model to predict the (exploitability or exploitation)
value based on the parameter values, via the Statsmodels Python module [88].
Below, we show the verbatim output of this analysis in Figure 16. What this shows is the effect when
removing individual settings of parameter values on the overall prediction that includes all of the data.
It does not (necessarily) show the best value for each parameter, since the parameter values could
combine in some complex non-linear way.
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Figure 10: Effect of DCH parameters in two-player Leduc Poker (NashConv).
We observe one particularly interesting point from this analysis: both the meta-solver and the level
structure in DCH seem to have a stronger effect on lowering NashConv in three-player Leduc than in
two-player Leduc. This could be due to the fact that the two-player game is smaller, and the DCH
is struggling to find a precise Nash equilibrium since it is instead maximizing reward against the
specific subset of (15) oracles. However, it could also be because opponent modeling and learning to
anticipate actions from the other players is more important when learning to play games with more
than two players. We hope to investigate this further: particularly the link between training regimes
for multiagent reinforcement learning that produce policies capable of generalizing to arbitrary
behavior online (during execution), and whether and how this could lead to an implicitly-encoded
Theory of Mind.
E.2 CFR Exploitability in Leduc
The convergence graph of vanilla CFR is shown in Figure 17. No abstractions were used.
The NASHCONV values reach at iteration 500 are 0.063591 for two-player, and 0.194337 for three-
player.
The value (i.e., expected winnings for first player under any exact Nash equilibrium) of two-player
Leduc is −0.085606424078, so the second player has a slight advantage. To compute this number,
the exact Nash equilibrium was obtained using sequence-form linear programming [51]; see also [90,
Section 5.2.3].
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Figure 11: Effect of DCH parameters in two-player Leduc Poker (exploitation).
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Figure 12: 2-player: Exploitation vs. CFR500pure
E.3 Computing the Explicit Meta-Policy for Exploitability in PSRO/DCH
In PSRO and DCH, the meta-strategy σi is a distribution over policies Πi. The combination of the
two encodes a single stochastic policy piσi that can be obtained by doing a pass through the game tree.
In terms of computational game theory, this means applying Kuhn’s theorem [53] to convert a mixed
strategy to a behavior strategy.
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Figure 13: 3-player: exploitation vs. random bots
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Figure 14: Effect of DCH parameter value of γ on NashConv overall in two-player Leduc
For each information state I , the probability of taking action a is piσi (I, a). This can be computed by
computing weights WI,a which is the sum over global states s ∈ I of reach probabilities to get to s
under each policy pii,k ∈ Πi times the probability σi(pii,k) · pii(s, a). Then the final stochastic policy
is obtained by
piσi (s, a) =
WI,a∑
a′WI,a′
.
(Note that opponents’ policies need not be considered in the computation as they would cancel when
WI,a is normalized.)
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Figure 15: Effect of DCH parameter value of γ on NashConv per meta-solver two-player Leduc
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DCH in 2-player Leduc for NashConv
OLS Regression Results
==============================================================================
Dep. Variable: AUC R-squared: 0.555
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.555
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 897.2
Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2017 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 16:18:25 Log-Likelihood: -1318.8
No. Observations: 6480 AIC: 2658.
Df Residuals: 6470 BIC: 2725.
Df Model: 9
Covariance Type: nonrobust
=====================================================================================================
coef std err t P>|t| [0.025 0.975]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intercept 3.1009 0.015 209.735 0.000 3.072 3.130
C(learning_rate)[T.0.0001] -0.0551 0.007 -7.472 0.000 -0.070 -0.041
C(min_exploration_weight)[T.0.25] -0.3261 0.009 -36.109 0.000 -0.344 -0.308
C(min_exploration_weight)[T.0.40] -0.4791 0.009 -53.049 0.000 -0.497 -0.461
C(metasolver)[T.uprd] -0.3974 0.009 -44.000 0.000 -0.415 -0.380
C(metasolver)[T.urm] -0.3359 0.009 -37.195 0.000 -0.354 -0.318
C(load_period)[T.2500] 0.0328 0.009 3.630 0.000 0.015 0.050
C(load_period)[T.5000] 0.0998 0.009 11.047 0.000 0.082 0.117
meta_strategy_update_period 0.0004 0.001 0.384 0.701 -0.002 0.003
np.log(level) -0.2542 0.005 -52.075 0.000 -0.264 -0.245
==============================================================================
Omnibus: 186.685 Durbin-Watson: 0.982
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 223.211
Skew: 0.366 Prob(JB): 3.39e-49
Kurtosis: 3.539 Cond. No. 28.3
==============================================================================
DCH in 3-player Leduc for NashConv
OLS Regression Results
==============================================================================
Dep. Variable: AUC R-squared: 0.750
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.750
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 3239.
Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2017 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 16:27:45 Log-Likelihood: -4302.7
No. Observations: 9720 AIC: 8625.
Df Residuals: 9710 BIC: 8697.
Df Model: 9
Covariance Type: nonrobust
======================================================================================================
coef std err t P>|t| [0.025 0.975]
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intercept 5.7709 0.015 376.465 0.000 5.741 5.801
C(learning_rate)[T.0.0001] 0.2603 0.008 34.046 0.000 0.245 0.275
C(min_exploration_weight)[T.0.25] -0.4380 0.009 -46.773 0.000 -0.456 -0.420
C(min_exploration_weight)[T.0.40] -0.6584 0.009 -70.311 0.000 -0.677 -0.640
C(metasolver)[T.uprd] -0.9475 0.009 -101.178 0.000 -0.966 -0.929
C(metasolver)[T.urm] -0.9550 0.009 -101.984 0.000 -0.973 -0.937
C(load_period)[T.2500] -0.0231 0.009 -2.464 0.014 -0.041 -0.005
C(load_period)[T.5000] 0.0757 0.009 8.079 0.000 0.057 0.094
meta_strategy_update_period -0.0012 0.001 -1.056 0.291 -0.003 0.001
np.log(level) -0.4797 0.005 -94.801 0.000 -0.490 -0.470
==============================================================================
Omnibus: 2064.928 Durbin-Watson: 0.916
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 7655.088
Skew: 1.030 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 6.829 Cond. No. 28.3
==============================================================================
Figure 16: Output of regression tests to interpret effects of DCH parameters. For these results, we
used a MAUC of the NashConv over the most recent 128 values.
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Figure 17: NashConv values of vanilla CFR in two-player and three-player Leduc Poker.
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